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Abstract
In this paper we analyse a setup where consumers are heterogeneous in the
perception of environmental quality. The equilibrium is veried in a setting with
horizontal and vertical (green) di¤erentiation. Prots are increasing in the misper-
ception of quality, while, the investment in green quality decreases the more the
goods are substitutes. We further consider the introduction of either an emission
tax or an environmental standard. The former rises the investment in environmen-
tal quality due to the higher cost of production, whereas in equilibrium quality
always improves after the introduction of the latter. We show that an optimal
environmental standard is an e¤ective regulatory instrument against greenwashing
and that the e¢ cacy of the interventions is conditioned to the damage distribution
and the aggregate level of emission.
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1 Introduction
Access to knowledge and innovations in technology have led to increasing awareness of
environmental issues. Several studies have shown that world-wide, consumers appetite
for green products has increased signicantly in the past years (Chase and Smith, 1992;
Kim and Choi, 2005; Chen, 2008, inter alia). Communities demand cleaner environments
and the rise of consciousness has resulted in signicant environmental improvement (Re-
itman, 1992). More companies around the world have reacted by developing eco-friendly
products (Kohl, 1991; Chang, 2011). The eco-label is, for instance, one of the practises
which allows consumers to identify the quality and the environmental consequences of a
production process generally unobservable.
The role of information di¤usion and the quality perception have been partially
underscored in studies dealing with environmental policies.1 Environmental regulation in
the literature is usually viewed as a form of agency issue where the polluting rms have
better information about the true level of their abatement activities than the regulator.
If certain aspects of environmental quality are costly to measure, regulators may resort
to proxies to infer information about environmental quality. This may allow rms to
circumvent the regulatory constraints by maximizing along those margins that are costly
to measure (Bansal and Gangopadhyay, 2003).
In this paper, instead, an alternative perspective is proposed. We investigate the
e¤ect of environmental regulation when green consumers misperceive the quality of the
products. In reality, there is a perception in the marketplace that a green package equals
greater value. With little knowledge to make an informed decision, individuals seem to
rely on rmspackaging to understand the positive (or negative) impact of production.
This should not come as too much of a surprise, as consumers have traditionally lacked
a detailed understanding of green innovation. Part of the consumers would undertake
larger green consumption if they better understood the impact that each production has
on the society. Others would confuse the level of transparency when there are no specic
criteria qualifying a product as green.2 The benets by appearing to be a green company
come in the form of a higher stock price, more customers or favoured partnerships with
green organisations (Doni and Ricchiuti, 2013). Thus paradoxically, higher prices are
more easily understood by consumers with respect to other features, especially when
comparing products and green investments across categories. They implicitly suggest
signicant eco-investments of the rms and justify payback period facilitating consumer
decisions on those products.
This marketing strategies in order to appear environmentally friendly, i.e., green-
washing, usually occurs when a company spends more time and money claiming green
production through advertising and marketing than actually implementing business prac-
tices that minimize environmental impact.3 Firms may operate in a way that is damaging
1An interesting exception relies on the signaling framework proposed by Sengupta (2012a).
2For instance most of the products that make the claim are biodegradable, phosphate and chlorine
free may still derive their ingredients from petrochemicals like crude oil or natural gas (which are not
renewable). https://www.gmaonline.org/downloads/research-and-reports/greenshopper09.pdf
3The tools used in greenwashing can include press releases about green projects or task forces put
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to the environment or in an opposite manner to the goal of the announced initiatives.4
Since consumers evaluation is based on advertising to make decisions, greenwashing
distorts their condence (Hamann and Kapelus, 2004) and therefore it is positively as-
sociated to confusion and perceived risk (Chen and Chang, 2013).
This paper presents a model of regulation in the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation of environmental quality. Our framework is characterized by the heterogeneity
of consumers due to environmental awareness. We model the di¤erence in consumers
environmental concern as a di¤erence in their level of information. Indeed, like consumer
consciousness (and perhaps related to it), the stringency of public regulation may have
di¤erent e¤ects according to the misperception of the market. Throughout the paper, we
focus on the extent and manner in which the quality perception of conscious consumers
induces di¤erent environmental performances and analyse their impacts of aggregate
qualities. We treat regulation as exogenous and abstract from information problems be-
tween the regulator and rms. The aim is to understand how changes in regulation may
inuence the incentive of rms to invest in green technology or realising greenwashing
behaviour.
In the baseline model, we evaluate the unregulated equilibrium and examine the
variation in terms of under- (over-) estimation of the true quality. The equilibrium is
symmetric. Prots in equilibrium are increasing in the perception, while, the investment
in green quality decreases the more the goods are substitutes. Indeed, a higher degree of
substitutability implies higher competition. Thus rms react by softening their invest-
ment in environmental quality. The paper considers next two government interventions.
First we investigate the e¤ect of a tax on polluting emissions. This policy increases
the investment in environmental quality due to changes on rmsincentives. The idea is
that a company invests in green quality not only to acquire green consumers, like in the
baseline model, but also to reduce tax burdening. We investigate next the introduction
of an endogenous tax. The level of optimal taxation increases with the marginal dam-
age on emissions if the average perception of environmental quality is high. A higher
perception of environmental quality implies larger demand. If the marginal damage of
emission is high, at the optimum, the increase in demands needs to be compensated by
higher taxation. Moreover, the optimal tax decreases with the average perception of
environmental quality if the marginal damage of emission is high. When production is
very polluting, the optimal tax burden is heavy, but if the perception of environmental
quality is high, the demand is so large that a lower level of taxation is su¢ cient to reach
the optimum.
The second intervention regards the environmental standard. Despite of the down-
ward sloping rmsreaction functions in quality which imply negative strategic e¤ects,
the impact of an environmental standard is that of increasing the perceived environ-
mental quality even for consumers who underestimate quality. This e¤ect rises their
into place, energy reduction or pollution reduction e¤orts, and rebranding of consumer products and
advertising materials.
4Lyon and Maxwell (2011) analyse greenwashing as a game between a rm and an activist. In their
analysis, greenwashing implies that the rm selectively discloses the positive information about their
environmental or social performance without full revealing negative information.
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willingness to pay for the goods, while increasing rms prots. The results explain
the producerswillingness to accept the introduction of a standard. Instead, an en-
dogenous environmental standard bites if the overestimation of environmental quality of
some consumers is very high. The overestimation is positively related to greenwashing
since the investment in green advertising induces consumers to overstate the environ-
mental quality of the product. Firms invest more in environmental quality due to an
optimal environmental standard representing an e¤ective regulatory instrument in case
of greenwashing.
The economic literature has recently analysed the presence of green consumers.
A rst group of papers focused on the impact of a higher consumers consciousness
on the market equilibrium and the associated social welfare (Eriksson, 2004 and Con-
rad, 2005). A second group dealt with the presence of green consumers interacts with
the optimal environmental policy (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995, Cremer and Thisse,
1999, Moraga-Gonzales and Padron-Fumero, 2002, Lombardini-Riipen, 2005). Finally,
the presence of green consumers has been examined in relation with socially responsible
rms (Rodriguez-Ibeas, 2007, Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis, 2009, Doni and Ricchiuti,
2013), or in determining the validity of the Porter hypothesis (Andrè et al., 2009, Lam-
bertini and Tampieri, 2012). The common framework of these contributions is the pure
vertically di¤erentiated duopoly. Unlike these approaches, our framework considers both
horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation and goods di¤er in the degree of substitutability
and in (environmental) quality.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 shows the baseline results. Section 4 consider the regulated equilibrium through
two interventions, namely, the introduction of either a tax on emission or a standard
of environmental quality with a simple simulation comparing their e¤ect on quality.
These regulatory interventions are developed and compared in Section 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3,
respectively. Concluding remarks are proposed in Section 5.
2 The model
Consider an economy with two rms, each producing one di¤erentiated good. Firms
compete by choosing the environmental quality level of their products and their prices.5
There is a number of consumers with mass normalised to 1. Their representative utility
function, U (x1; x2), is:6
U (x1; x2) = (+ e1)x1 + (+ e2)x2   x
2
1 + 2x1x2 + x
2
2
2
+ c0; (1)
where xi denotes the representative consumers quantity of good i, i 2 f1; 2g; ei rep-
resents the environmental quality of good i; c0 is the quantity of the numeraire good;
5Note that the demand function takes into account both horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation, while,
the information technology is the same between rms.
6See Häckner (2000).
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while,  2 [0; 1] denotes the degree of substitutability between the two goods, with  = 0
identifying independent goods and  = 1 in case of perfect substitutes.7 Under symmet-
ric information, consumers are perfectly aware of the intrinsic environmental quality of
goods 1 and 2.8 For each i 2 f1; 2g, utility maximisation with respect to x1 and x2 gives
a certain demand function:
xi (pi; pj; ei; ej) =
 (1  ) + (ei   ej)  pi + pj
1  2 ; j 2 f1; 2g ; j 6= i: (2)
The rise in consumers ecological consciousness is constrained by the fact that
often they do not have su¢ cient information about the environmental quality of rms
production. We model this uncertainty in environmental consciousness as a case of
imperfect information in detecting the environmental quality. Environmental perceptions
are independent draws. The consumers signal about the quality of good i is i, i 2 f1; 2g.
Only a proportion  2 (0; 1) of the population recognises the true quality. In this
case they (i) are aware that the environmental damage are harmful for them and (ii)
perceive the correct quality of the good i, i.e., i = ei. A partial environmentally aware
agents may instead capture interesting aspects. For instance companies use their ads and
marketing campaigns to mislead consumers, by overstating claims of their environmental
performance.9 For i 2 f1; 2g, a proportion of 1   consumers do not recognise the true
environmental quality. It is equiprobable that they expect low quality i = e0 or high
quality i = em > e0. The symmetry in the probabilities of the events is for the sake
of simplicity. It has the advantage of keeping the analysis tractable to examine the
impact of wrong perception of goods. The interpretation of a consumer with uncertain
perception is therefore:
 i = e0 < ei: the consumer might underestimate the environmental quality of good
i;
 i = em > ei: the consumer might overestimate the environmental quality of good
i.
Let us dene e0 and em as the underestimation and the overestimation of en-
vironmental quality, respectively. In particular, em can be interpreted as a measure of
green washing. It implicitly infers the rms practise of making unwarranted or overblown
claims of sustainability or environmental friendliness in an attempt to gain market share.
The higher the signal em, the larger the consumersoverperception of the environmental
quality of the good. The (expected) proportion of consumers that receive the correct
information about the environmental quality of both goods is 2. Then, a proportion
of (1  )2 of consumers are expected to receive wrong information about both goods,
7A similar procedure is proposed by Garella and Petrakis (2008). They analyse the e¤ect of intro-
ducing a minimum quality standard when consumers are not perfectly informed of goodsquality.
8Note that quality enters in the intercept of the utility function. Symeonidis (2003) considers the
alternative approach in which qualities alter the slope of the demand functions.
9See Delmas and Lessen (2014) for a eld experiment on this issue.
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whereas 2 (1  ) are expected to perceive wrong information about at most one of
the goods. Furthermore, there are four equiprobable realisations of perceptions pairs
(e0; e0) ; (em; em) ; (e0;em) and (em; e0), for individuals misperceiving the quality of both
goods. There are two equiprobable realisations for consumers with perception of good
1, namely (e0;e2) ; and (em; e2). Similar results for good 2. According to the perceived
di¤erences on quality, the demand for good 1 by N = 1 ex-ante identical consumers is
given by:
q1 = 
2x1 (e1; e2)+ (3)
 (1  )
2
[x1 (e1; em) + x1 (e0; e2) + x1 (e1; e0) + x1 (em; e2)] +
(1  )2
4
[x1 (e0; e0) + x1 (em; e0) + x1 (e0; em) + x1 (em; em)] :
We thus represent nine types of consumers: one group of fully aware consumers, four
groups of partially aware ones and the last four groups of wrongly aware consumers.
Substituting in (3), the demand qi is:
qi (pi; pj; ei; ej) =
(1  )  + 1
2
(em + e0)

+  (ei   ej)  pi + pj
1  2 : (4)
The role of information di¤usion and absorption is crucial in this analysis. The demand
function of rm i always increases with the average value of quality misperception, i.e.,
e = 1
2
(em + e0). Intuitively, consumersappetite for green products leads rms to put
forward the better ecological quality of a given product. As discussed above, the eco-
labels, for instance, are some of the instruments used by rms to win market shares thanks
to a di¤erentiation strategy surng the wave of consumersecological awareness. Since
the environmental consequences of the production and the consumption of a product are
generally unobservable, the eco-label appears as one of the way for consumers to collect
such information. The higher the average misperception in quality induced by rms, the
larger the demand for that good.
Consider next the supply side. Each rm produces one of the two goods. We
normalise marginal costs of production to zero, while xed costs are increasing in quality:
C1 = e
2
1; C2 = e
2
2: (5)
Thus the prot of rm i is:
i = piqi (pi; pj)  Ci: (6)
In the spirit of Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995), emission in the industry is regu-
lated such that each rm is required to reduce emission at an endogenous quality level ei,
i 2 f1; 2g. Production goes along with pollutant at the level E. Here quality in emission
is a proxy for any kind of reduction on environmental damage. The net level of emission
is therefore E = E   (e1 + e2), where E > 0. This assumption rules out the unrealistic
case in which investing in green quality more than o¤set pollution. Indeed although
new technologies and cleaner fuel can help cut down emissions of pollutants into the
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atmosphere, they are not replacing the non-green conventional production eliminating
denitively the environmental damage. The damage value is assumed as a quadratic
function of emissions, D = dE2; where d relies on the marginal damage of emissions.10
Consumer surplus, CS, is computed as the weighted average of the aggregate utility of
all consumerstypes. For instance, the utility of the consumers who are fully aware of
goods 1 and 2 quality is given by:
U (x1; x2) = (+ e

1)x1 + (+ e

2)x2  
(x21 + x
2
2 + 2x1x2)
2
  p1x1   p2x2: (7)
Similar for the other groups.11 Thus social welfare in the society is given by:
SW =
X1;2
i
i + CS  D:
The timing of the game is as follows. In the rst stage, rms choose the level of environ-
mental quality. In the second stage, rms compete in prices. The equilibrium concept is
the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction.
3 Baseline results
Begin by the market stage. Each rm i maximises prots with respect to pi. The
equilibrium price is
pi (ei; ej) =
 
2     2 [+ e (1  )] +  ei  2  2  ej
4  2 ; (8)
where p1 = p

2 if and only if e1 = e2. The equilibrium price of rm i is decreasing in the
quality level chosen by its rival, ej. Intuitively, a rise in consumersconsciousness in-
creases their willingness to pay for environmental quality and reects a higher consumers
marginal utility when they buy a green product. When a rivals quality increases, the
premium commanded by ones own quality level at equilibrium is monotonically reduced.
Indeed, the whole demand function to rm i is shifted down. This negative e¤ect is higher
the larger the degree of the substitutability between the two goods, . The positive ef-
fect of perceived environmental quality e on higher prices supports the idea that green
consumers are in favour of an eco-friendly progress and pay more attention to prices for
those products. Equilibrium quantities are consequently given by:
qi
 
pi (ei; ej) ; p

j (ei; ej)

=
pi
1  2 : (9)
Thus they have the same properties of prices with respect to ej and e.
In the rst stage, each rm i maximises its prot with respect to its environmental
quality ei:
10For simplicity, we abstract away from spillovers in the industry.
11See the appendix for the computation of consumer surplus.
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max
ei
i =
[pi (ei; ej)]
2
1  2   Ci (ei; ej) :
The rst order condition yields the best reply function for rm i:
ei (ej) = e (0) 
2
 
2  2 
4  22  1  2  2  2  22 ej; (10)
where
e (0) =

 
2  2 (1 + ) (1  ) [(1  ) (em + e0) =2 + ] 
4  22  1  2  2  2  22 ;
and the denominator is always positive.12 A preliminary result can be summarised in
the next lemma:
Lemma 1 Green qualities are strategic substitutes.
P roof. See the Appendix
A rms marginal revenue is sensitive to a change in its own environmental quality
relative to a change in the rivals. Given the values of  and , the magnitude of quality
di¤erence indicates the degree to which the consumersperceive the two products are
di¤erentiated, or inversely, how close strategic substitutes the two products are from the
rmsperspectives. Thus an increase of the environmental quality of the competitor
increases the marginal return from investing in ones own quality. When the degree of
substitutability increases, the two products become more homogeneous (lower di¤eren-
tiation or strategically perfect substitutes) and the rmsprots would drop to a lower
level. Solving the system of (10), the equilibrium qualities are symmetric:
ei =

 
2  2 [+ (em + e0) (1  ) =2]
(2  )2 (1 + ) (2 + )  2  2  22 : (11)
Condition ei > e0 holds for
e0 < e0    2  2 [em (1  ) + 2]
2 (2  )2 (1 + ) (2 + ) +  (1 + )  2  2 : (12)
Eq. (12) highlights the role played by the underestimation of consumersperception
and their belief that a higher environmental quality on the upper bound, em, signals an
increase in the total environmental quality of the production process. The solution
concept is therefore satised whenever the underestimation of perception is not too high,
otherwise is not feasible. Moreover this symmetric outcome arises when the degree of
substitution is not too high. Note that the equilibrium outcome of the pure vertically
12See the appendix
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di¤erentiated duopoly model cannot realise as a limiting case of our model as  tends to
1. The demand systems are quite distinct to the case with only vertical di¤erentiation.
In our system, each consumer buys a variable quantity of both goods, whereas she buys
a single unit of one good in the purely vertical di¤erentiation models.13 In equilibrium,
rm is prices and prots are respectively,
pi =
 
1  2  4  2

 
2  2 ei ; (13)
and
i =
 
1  2  4  22     2  22
2
 
2  22 e2i : (14)
We are now in a position to examine the characteristics of the equilibrium. Begin the
comparative statics analysis by evaluating how a variation in the degree of substitutabil-
ity inuences the equilibrium quality, we obtain that:
Lemma 2 The investment in green quality decreases the more the goods are substitutes.
P roof. See the appendix.
Lemma 2 suggests that the equilibrium quality is directly related to the degree
of product substitutability only if the relative extra cost of producing green quality is
su¢ ciently low. The convenience of the investment places countervailing incentives on a
rms optimal level of quality. Lower margins decrease the immediate costs of production,
but also reduce the opportunity to face higher price and greater demand motivated by
consumersenvironmental consciousness.
Consider further the analysis of a variation in the average perception of environ-
mental quality. Di¤erentiating the equilibrium qualities,
@ei
@e
=
2 (2  )  2  2 (1  )
4 (2  ) 2 (1 + ) (2 + )  2 > 0: (15)
The uncertainty about the value of the quality of a good has directly implications with
personal misperception. In particular, given (15) together with (9), (13) and (14), it
follows that,
Proposition 1 Qualities, prices, quantities and prots in equilibrium increase in the
average misperception of environmental quality.
P roof. See the Appendix
The chain of evaluations leading from an increase in the misperception to an in-
crease in prots, prices and quantities is fairly straightforward. Indeed Proposition 1
implies that, the higher the average quality perceived by the non-environmentally aware
consumers, the larger the demand for rms product and the higher the rmsincentives
to invest in environmental quality due to a higher price in equilibrium.
13See Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982), inter alia.
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4 Regulatory interventions
Emissions taxes and environmental standards are widely considered as the most common
policy instruments for regulation of environmental externalities. Taxes generally raise
government revenue, while usually an environmental standard species with a certain
degree of precision the actions that a rm should undertake to achieve certain objec-
tives.14 An emission tax works through the market imposing a higher cost per unit of
production. Pollution is therefore priced by the tax inducing entrepreneurs to release
less of it. By leaving polluters free to choose their optimal emission levels, they can use
their own strategy in order to minimize their costs. The optimal process for polluters
minimizes their total private costs by reducing emissions until the tax rate equals their
marginal abatement cost. This could be determined by any combination of pollution
abatement or green innovation as in Sengupta (2012b).
The environmental standard requires rms emission not to fall short of a given
level. With perfect information and a denite quality standard, a rm has in principle
the same total abatement costs as in the tax system, but unlike the tax system it does
not have to pay for abatement.15 This result is conrmed in case of environmentally
conscious consumers by Deltas et al. (2013). From a public policy view, the net social
benets of the tax or a standard set at the socially e¢ cient level of emissions are identical.
What di¤ers is the impact on the polluters. We observe that these results are not true in
case of imperfect information on quality since environmental standard bites if and only
if the overestimation of the environmental quality em is su¢ ciently high.16
The aim of this section is therefore to point out whether these instruments and their
impacts are indeed best in the presence of market failures, such as the misperception on
quality and the extreme case of greenwashing (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011). To uncover the
importance of the misperception among consumers, we introduce in the next subsection
both emission tax and environmental standard in our framework comparing their e¤ects
on quality and welfare.
4.1 Tax on emissions
Let us rst introduce a tax on emissions in the system. Firm is prot function is given
by:
i = piqi (pi; pj)  Ci   tE; (16)
where taxation is a linear function of emissions, E and t is the unit tax. In turn, social
welfare becomes
SW =
X1;2
i
i + CS  D + T;
14See Holland (2012).
15See Bottega and De Freitas (2009).
16See Sengupta (2012a) for an alternative model in the presence of misperception of quality of green
consumers.
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where T = 2tE denotes total tax revenue. The market stage remains unchanged com-
pared to the unregulated case. In the rst stage, equilibrium qualities are:
eti =  
t (2  )2 (1 + ) (2 + )  2 [e2 (1  ) + ]  2  2
2
 
2  2 (1 + ) (2 + )  2 : (17)
Eq. (17) underlines the role placed by the average misperception on quality level.
In particular, it inuences negatively the quality derived on tax emission. This result is
still valid if the degree of substitution is high. Comparing the level of qualities with the
(previous) unregulated case we get,
ei   eti =  
t (2  )2 (1 + ) (2 + )
2
 
2  2 (1 + ) (2 + )  2 < 0: (18)
Therefore,
Proposition 2 The introduction of a tax on polluting emission increases the investment
in environmental quality.
P roof. See the Appendix
A tax on emission increases in the so-called long run e¤ect (quality choice) as
demonstrated by Oueslati (2014), although the e¤ect over short run (price choice) is
ambiguous and is entirely due to uncertainty in perception of green consumers. By
introducing a Pigouvian tax, the objective of investing in environmental quality becomes
two-fold: a rm invests in green quality in order to acquire green consumers, meanwhile,
the investment reduces scal costs.
Now suppose that there is a pre-stage where government sets a Pigouvian tax with
the aim to maximise social welfare. The rst order condition of SW with respect to t
yields the socially optimal tax t.17 The result can be summarised as follows18:
Proposition 3 The level of optimal taxation
 increases with the marginal damage of emissions when e > e.
 decreases with the average perception of environmental quality when d > ed .
17See the appendix.
18See the appendix for denitions of e, ed and proofs.
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P roof. See the Appendix
If the marginal damage of emission is high, at the optimal level, the increase of de-
mand needs to be compensated by higher taxation. When production is very polluting,
the optimal tax burden is heavy. Higher perception of environmental quality induces
greater demand functions such that a lower level of taxation is su¢ cient to reach the op-
timum. Further, we examine how the optimal tax reacts to the presence of greenwashing
by the analysis of a variation in em. Di¤erentiating t with respect to em yields:
@t
@em
> 0; (19)
for d < ed.
P roof. See the Appendix
Eq. (19) shows that an increase in the quality upper bound positively inuences the
endogenous level of taxation. This echoes an argument about the e¤ect of greenwashing
in regulatory terms. The misperception in quality (and in particular a potential rise in the
upper bound, em) allows rms to use their production prole to create an eco-friendly
image of themselves. An instance is the traditional activity of loggers in developing
countries.19 In this case, the misperception helps to support higher level of taxation
since the incentives on green products rise meanwhile. This means that, although the
aggregate emission is lower, the green consumersuncertainty allows higher prots for
the rms. As a consequence, total abatement costs and the derived damages for each
unit of emissions are not the same as in the endogenous evaluation of tax rate.
4.2 Environmental standard
In this section we introduce an environmental standard that sets the minimum level of
environmental quality. It is generally dened by regulation which species the maximum
permissible concentration of a potentially hazardous chemical in an environmental sam-
ple. We denote it in our model as be > e0, i.e., a predetermined value higher than the
lower bound in misperception. Whenever be > e0, eco-friendly consumers, who receive the
low quality signal for good i, revise their beliefs and update it to e0 = be. This increases
their willingness to pay for that product. Begin by evaluating how this inuences the
quality investment in equilibrium. Di¤erentiating e1 and e

2 with respect to e0, it yields:
@ei
@e0
=

 
2  2 (1  )
2 (2  )2 (1 + ) (2 + )  22 > 0: (20)
This result implies that the environmental standard has a positive impact on rms
qualities satisfying the higher need of green products.
19During the razing of rainforests, World Wildlife Fund (WWF) was accused to be soft on the loggers
and allowed them to use the iconic panda logo of WWF. The most evident case was the Malaysian one,
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/les/pdfs/Pandering_to_the_loggers.pdf
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Proposition 4 Introducing an environmental standard increases the quality investment
of both rms.
P roof. See the Appendix
The higher willingness to pay of consumers in turn a¤ects the rmsincentives to
invest in environmental quality. The consumers signal about the environmental per-
formance of the rms creates an incentive for the latters to act di¤erently with respect
to the case of symmetric information. The implementation of a standard guarantees a
higher level of green type due to the exogenous threshold. With regards to the e¤ect of
substitutability among goods, we di¤erentiate with respect to  such that:
@ei
@e0@
=  
 
8  8   22 + 83 + 4   25 (1  )
2

8 + 4   3 + 4   22   2  6  22 < 0: (21)
This implies that the substitutability among goods, , reduces the impact of this
policy in the market. Even if regulatory authorities (through environmental standard)
succeed in inducing cleaner products among rms, its success (and e¢ cacy) entirely
depends on the substitutability of the products. This is due to the lack of strategic
e¤ects. Moreover, the higher willingness to pay for green products induces rms to invest
in higher quality and green innovation. This e¤ect is still higher, the more the goods are
substitutes. Let us evaluate how the impact of the environmental standard inuences
qualities, prices, quantities and prots. According to Proposition 1 and observing the
role of the standard, it follows that:
Proposition 5 Qualities, prices, quantities and prots rise in equilibrium if an envi-
ronmental standard, be, is introduced such that be > e0.
P roof. See the Appendix
Since the consumerswillingness to pay is increased with respect to the unregulated
case, thus their demand for both goods shifts up. Firms o¤er goods of higher quality
(Proposition 5), so that they can also charge higher prices. In turn prots increase.
Consider next the introduction of an endogenous environmental standard.20 Sup-
pose that there is a pre-stage in which the government sets an environmental standardbe > e0 so as to maximise social welfare. Consumers will update their evaluation of the
lower bound of environmental quality, so that e0 = be. The rst order condition with
respect to e0 yields e0.
21 Di¤erentiating e0 with respect to em yields:
@e0
@em
> 0; (22)
20See Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) for an analysis of endogenous minimum quality standard.
21See the appendix.
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for d < bd.22 Eq. (22) suggests that if the environmental damage in the industry is
relative low, the overestimation of the environmental quality of the green consumers has
a positive e¤ect on the optimal level of lower bound. Thus in case of uncertain qualities,
greenwashing behaviour drives a rise in the optimal endogenous standard of the rms and
guarantees an e¤ective policy by the government. In other words, whether the relative
dirty types partially imitate the clean ones, this ensures benecial impact in terms of
prots due to environmental consciousness. This is possible only if the emissions are
not so harmful or relatively limited over time. Otherwise, the presence of greenwashing
reduces the endogenous threshold motivated by lower expected returns.
The next question is whether or not the introduction of an optimal environmental
standard would bite, i.e., if it indeed a¤ect the level of investment in environmental
quality of the rm or not. Comparing be with ei , i.e., the equilibrium quality in the
unregulated case yields:
e0   ei > 0;
for
em > em; (23)
where em is dened in the appendix. Hence
Proposition 6 An optimal environmental standard bites only if the overestimation of
the environmental quality em is su¢ ciently high.
P roof. See the Appendix
Proposition 6 shows how the perception of environmental quality may a¤ect the ef-
fectiveness of a policy based on environmental standards. In particular, when consumers
overestimation, em, is high, demands increase even in case of low perception. Indeed,
rms are willing to invest less in environmental quality since consumers overestimate
it considerably. In this case, the introduction of an optimal environmental standard
induce rms to invest more in quality, and therefore, it is an e¤ective regulatory tool
in industries where greenwashing is adopted. Notice that there is no trade-o¤ between
consumer surplus and damage function. This is due to the fact that the quality is green
and consumers internalise it in their utility function, so that incentives are aligned. This
e¤ect does not emerge in situations where quality is hedonic. In this case, an increase
in consumer surplus would imply higher emissions (Lambertini and Tampieri, 2012 and
Ecchia et al., 2013).
4.3 Emission tax vs environmental standard
We now propose a simple simulation to investigate the impact of the two policies on
quality levels. Unlike the case of perfect information, where the e¤ect on qualities is
analogous between the two interventions (Holland, 2012), we show that the misperception
22See the appendix for eq. (22) and the denition of bd dened in (27).
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in qualities determines a di¤erent e¤ect of the emission tax and the standard. The results
entirely depend on the value of emissions produced by the rms. First, it is worth to
point out that introducing the emission standard does not change the ranking in qualities
whenever the value of greenwashing is relatively low as demonstrated by Proposition 6.
The only alternative in this case is to apply a tax per unit of emission costs. Hence
in the simulation we set the conditions on em such that the environmental standard is
biting (see the appendix). Whether the misperception is high, instead, the quality levels
determined by the two policies depend on the level of emissions generated by the rms.
We assume generic values of the parameters of the model: the proportion of green
consumers able to perceive the true quality, , is equal to 0:1; the substitutability among
goods, , is assumed to be 0:3; while, the constant coe¢ cient  is 1. Figure 1 summarises
the results. For lower level of damage, d, the environmental standard with misperception
ensures higher level of quality. This supports the idea that, for limited levels of emission,
the impact of greenwashing is still higher under the standard than under the tax. A
similar e¤ect occurs from the underestimation. The results are not conrmed for higher
value of damages, where a tax on emission guarantees higher level of environmental
quality. This shift occurs since an emission tax imposes a higher unit of production cost
and its impact expands for higher level of emissions rising the abatement costs has shown
above.
Figure 1: Emission tax vs environmental standard
As a general perspective this implies that an environmental standard accompanied
by greenwashing behaviour increases the e¤ective marginal cost more than the tax for
lower amount of damages. Both interventions increase the e¤ective marginal cost of
production, exert an ongoing pressure on price competition and reduce the output of
the not eco-friendly products. However a lower quality of the green products is ensured
under the standard whenever the polluting amount is high and is not overcompensated
by potential misperception.
The welfare realisations for consumers between the two policies might in principle
depend on the relative change in consumption due to environmental awareness. The
e¤ect could be even higher with asymmetric technology among rms. The idea is that the
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importance of environmental perception is reduced whenever one rm is more e¢ cient
than the competitor. This proxies the market power of the e¢ cient rm with higher
prots as quality increases. Accordingly, the weight of overestimation (and in turn
greenwashing) in determining prices is relatively lower than in the symmetric case, since
prots for the e¢ cient rm grow more than its less e¢ cient competitor. By the same
token, the level of e has a lower weight for the e¢ cient rm than for the ine¢ cient one.
It is higher in the presence of an environmental standard rather than with a tax on
emission, since the former policy does not a¤ect production costs. These impacts could
be so large under the standard relative to the tax that outweighs the reduction in the
environmental quality of the products. Other analysis on this point could be left for
future research.
5 Concluding remarks
The misperception in environmental quality and the potential greenwashing behaviour
of rms are arguably one of the most important e¤ects able to inuence the market size.
In a world of asymmetric information where green consumers misperceive the envi-
ronmental quality of the product and the consequent damage caused by rms production,
we have analysed the e¤ect of regulatory intervention as well as the incentive to invest
in cleaner process according to the aggregate emission level. Our framework evaluates a
two-stage game where companies rst maximise their prots, while, in the second stage,
rms set prices according to the individual perception on quality.
We show that consumers have di¤erent perceptions on quality, they are not able to
observe both the investment decision of the rm and the realised performance in terms
of innovation process and total emission. The heterogeneity of information that agents
can receive guarantees higher prots for rms and the e¤ect is higher, the larger is the
impact of greenwashing in the market due to the overestimation of the signal.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Consumer surplus
By evaluating the sum of utilities, consumer surplus is:
CS =
1
1  2

2
 
p21 + p
2
2 + e
2
m

+ 4 (1  ) (+ em + e0)  2p2 (2+ em + e0) (1  )+
  (e0 + em)2   2p2 (2e2   (em + e0) (1  )  2e1) +
 2 ((em + e0   e1   e2) (em + e0   e1   e2    (2+ em + e0)  2)) +
 2 (em + e0   2e1) (em + e0   2e2)
 2p1 ((em + e0) (1  ) (1  ) + 2 (+ p2 + e1     e2))] :
6.2 Proof of Lemma 1
The second order conditions of i with respect to ei yields:
@2i
@e2i
=
22
 
2  22 
4  22  1  2   2 < 0;
for
2 < b2   4  22  1  2 
2  22 : (24)
Thus the problem admits a maximum when the group of fully aware consumers is not too
large. Note also that b2 (1) = 0, implying that the equilibrium requires some substitutability
among goods. Condition (24) implies the positivity of best reply (10) and is su¢ cient condition
in order to get substitutability in quality investments.
6.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Di¤erentiating ei with respect to  yields:
@ei
@
=

 
8  8   22 + 83 + 4   25 [(em + e0) (1  ) =2 + 2]
2

8 + 4   3 + 4   22   2  6  222 < 0: (25)
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6.4 Characterization of the Endogenous Tax
The rst order condition of the Social Welfare Function SW with respect to t yields the optimal
level of taxation:
t = A+ eB;
where
A =
4de
 
2 +    22  2     2+ 2  1  2 2     4d  2  2+ 22  2  2   2de  1  2+ 23
2 (1 + 2d)
 
2 +    22  2     2   (2  )2 (1 + ) (2 + ) + 2 (1 + ) (2 + ) [1 +  (1  )]
B =
2 (1  ) 6 + 4d  2  32 + 4  2+  (5   (4 +  (2  )  ))
2 (1 + 2d)
 
2 +    22  2     2   (2  )2 (1 + ) (2 + ) + 2 (1 + ) (2 + ) [1 +  (1  )]
6.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Begin by examining the variation of the optimal tax to a change in the marginal damage of
emissions. Di¤erentiating t with respect to d yields:
@t
@d
/ 8 (1  )  1 +    2 (1  ) 8 + 4   3 + 4   22   2  6  2 e+
 4 (1  ) 8 + 4   3 + 4   22   2  6  2 2  3  5 + 22+
 e 8 + 83   24   4+ 2 + 2  6 + + 2+   8  4  2 > 0;
if and only if
e>e
where
e 4 (1  ) 8 + 4   3 + 4   22   2  6  2 2  3  5 + 22
8 (1  )  1 +    2 (1  ) 8 + 4   3 + 4   22   2  6  2
+
e

8 + 83   24   4+ 2 + 2  6 + + 2+   8  4  2
8 (1  )  1 +    2 (1  ) 8 + 4   3 + 4   22   2  6  2
Next, we investigate how a change in the perception of environmental quality would inu-
ence the optimal level of taxation. By di¤erentiating t with respect to the average perception
of environmental quality, it yields:
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@t
@e
=
2 (1  ) 6 + 4d  2  32 + 4+ 2   (5   (4 +  (2  )  ))h
 (2  )2   2 [1   (1  )]
i
(1 + ) (2 + )  2 (1 + 2d)  2 +    22  2     2 < 0
if and only if,
d > ed   [4     (4 +    (1 + ))]
4 (2  )2  1  2   12
The cross derivative of t with respect to e and d conrms the results above:
@t
@e@d
/ (2  )2 (1 + ) (2 + )  2  2  2 > 0
6.6 Proof of eq. (19)
Di¤erentiating t with respect to em yields:
@t
@em
=    (1  )

6 + 4d
 
2  32 + 4  2+  (5   (4 + 2 (2  ) + ))
(1 + ) (2 + )
h
 (2  )2   2 (1 +  (1  ))
i
  2 (1 + 2d)  2 +    22  2     2 > 0
6.7 Characterization of the Endogenous Standard
The rst order condition of SW with respect to t yields the optimal level of taxation:
e0 = C + emF; (26)
such that
C =
2 
2  2  	    and F = 1 2  2 z   
where variables , 	, ,  , z respectively indicating,
 = 2de (1  )  2  2 (2 + )  2 +    22  2  2   (2  )2 (1  ) (1 + )2 (2 + )2 (3  2)
	 = 2 (1 + )
 
2  2 12 + 4d (1  )  2  2   (8   (4  3))  3  2  22   2de  1  3
 = 22 (1 + )

18 + 2d (1  )  2  2   (10   (5  3))  (1 + )2 [7  3 (3  ) +  (1 +  (1  ))]
  = 3

3  22 + 4d  1  2+ 4
z = 22 (1 + 2d) (2  )2  1  2  (1  ) h(2  )2 (1 + )2 (2 + )2 (1 +  (1  ))i  3  2  22
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6.8 Proof of eq. (22):
Given eq. (26), it can be easily shown that @e

0
@em
= F . This is positive if and only if:
d < bd  (2  )2 (1 + )2 (2 + )2 [7  3 (3  ) +  (1 +  (1  ))]
42
 
2  22  1  2 (1  ) + (27)
+
3
 
3  22  2  22   22 (1 + )  2  2 [18   (10 +  (5  3))]
42
 
2  22  1  2 (1  )
6.9 Proof of Proposition 6
It is enough to prove that
em > em  +  
%+ #
(28)
where now all the variables , , %,# respectively indicating,
 = 2 (1  ) (1 + ) (3  2)  4  22 +  (2  )2 (2 + )  2  2 + 4de  1  2
 = 2
 
2  2 2d (e+ 4) (1  )  2  2+  [16   (12   (6  5))]  2de3 (1  )  2  22
% =
 
1 + 2   3  4  22   2 (2  )2 (2 + ) [4 +  (5   (1   (2 + )))]
# = 2
 
2  2 12 + 4d (1  )  2  2   [8   (4  3)]  23 (1 + 2d) (1  )  2  22
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